Spring 2009 IR Theory course wiki - Recently Updated Pages

Historical Materialism

NordSee — Wed, 17 Mar 2010 22:15:44 CDT

Historical Materialism is interested in the idea of an emerging global civil society (203).

Marx and Engels deal with this notion of historical materialism in their Communist Manifesto and their other writings:

Under materialism we need to understand two things in a society:
1. Forces of production: Raw materials, technology, skills etc. all fall under this category
2. Social relations of production: Forces of production and how production takes place

Relations of production defines the class structure in a society in which we have the bourgeoisie at the top, controlling the most of the wealth and the property. At the bottom are those who do most of the work. Despite the notion that we all come to this world equal, competition leads some controlling more than others, leaving majority with nothing but labor to sell. The consequence is an asymetrical relation between people who own and people who don't; the oppressor and the oppressed.

New war theory and Hobbes' state of nature

matt.espina — Tue, 07 Jul 2009 14:04:06 CDT

It is worthy to note that observations made in contemporary conflict literature greatly resemble Hobbes' state of nature. In conflicts where the state is weak, brutality, violence, and the supremacy of force have often come to the forefront, and selfish desires increasingly drive armed groups (in contrast to earlier political and ideological motivations of insurgent groups, even the same insurgent groups). This has occurred in many nations across many cultures, including Chechnya, Liberia, the Congo, Colombia, the Philippines, and more, lending credence to much of Hobbes' assertions.

The following explanation of New war theory is an excerpt from "New War and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front" by Matthew Espina

“New war theory” is a contemporary, evolving model and body of knowledge that was created in response to a unique transformation of warfare since 1945. For the past 200 years, military thought has been modeled on the principles of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. It has focused on warfare as an extension of policy by the nation-state, with nation states as the most important actors, and conflicts characterized by regular armies stressing the importance of high tech, high cost weaponry like tanks, airplanes, and naval ships. This type of combat today bears the honor of the title “conventional warfare.” [1]

Since 1945, however, there has been a radical shift away from this version of war. Only a minority of conflicts, roughly a quarter, fit into the framework of conventional war. Replacing conventional warfare as the most common conflict type is what has been deemed the “low intensity conflict (LIC).” [2]
Low Intensity Conflicts

Low intensity conflicts are distinguished from conventional wars by several unique characteristics. One, they have a strong tendency to occur in developing countries. Two, these conflicts almost never involve regular armies on both sides. Rather, they are often deployed on one side against a non-state group, be they guerillas, terrorists, or even ordinary citizens. Finally, the violence of LICs is not primarily carried out using the high-technology collective weaponry that conventional militaries are so proud of. There is reliance instead on small arms like the AK-47 rather than tanks, aircraft, and naval ships. [3]

The name “Low intensity conflict” has also proven itself somewhat of a misnomer. LICs are not only far more numerous than conventional conflicts, they are also far more bloody. For comparison, let us first take a look at the civil war in Lebanon. A fifteen year, low intensity conflict, the death toll is estimated to have claimed over 100,000 Lebanese lives. [4] Juxtapose this with the numerous conventional wars fought by the nation of Israel, conflicts justly hailed as the fiercest and most bloody conventional conflicts of their time. After four decades of conventional warfare, Israel’s death toll in its struggles against the regular, state armies of Arab nations had reached approximately 14,000. [5] This number pales in comparison to the dead in Lebanon, not to mention the more bloody LICs. There were an estimated 3 million dead in the four year Nigerian Civil War, a million dead in the thirty-year Vietnamese conflict, and a million dead in the French-Algerian War, to name only a few. [6] The number of human lives claimed by these LICs dwarfs that of conventional conflicts; and out of all the many conventional wars that have occurred since the end of World War II, there exist only two that have proven exceptions to this rule. [7] As we can see, the theories and tenets applied to conventional conflicts are increasingly out of their depth in the international arena.

Additionally, within these LICs, there have been a growing number of conflicts that defy the logic governing classic insurgencies, wars following the old logic where violence is a means to an end for political or ideological goals. This is a unique type of conflict that has occurred, and continues to occur, all around the world, including Liberia, Chechnya, Darfur, Northern Ireland and Colombia, [8] and many other countries. The list only continues to grow larger as time goes on.

In these conflicts, previous restraints on targets and tactics have become undone, leading to unprecedented brutality and ruthlessness. It has become more difficult to negotiate and deal with these armed groups. More civilians are both getting involved in and dying in these conflicts. States are finding themselves more and more incapable of dealing with the situations, and the rising trend of this type of violence is alarming. These new conditions and the evolution of these conflicts are aptly called “New War,” to express a distinct cleavage with traditional understandings of how and why groups of humans arm themselves to kill.

The literature [9] has generally acknowledged three key characteristics for recognizing these New War conflicts (although the causes behind these developments remain a matter of debate). First, the armed groups involved have diverged from their original ideological and/or political basis. While the often began their battles because of traditional motivations like self-determination, their motivations shift over time to become something completely different. The original ideology becomes mere rhetoric used as a convenient excuse while their actions speak otherwise. These “new warriors” fight for more primal desires: war to survive, war for plunder, power, and reputation, war for personal profit and enjoyment.
Second, the previously unified armed groups splinter and factionalize. Due to a collapse of the original organization’s ability to address the needs and desires of its members, a significant amount of its forces part ways. This can occur due to a loss of legitimacy, a loss of power, and/or a collapse of the organizational structure. This aspect of New War conflicts is a large part of what makes negotiations, peacekeeping, and peacemaking efforts exponentially more difficult, especially where multiple fragmentations occur.
Finally, the third characteristic is the weakness of the state. This is the most important of the three. The failure of the state to meet a population’s needs, specifically the inability to enforce law and order and to chase down and destroy the armed groups threatening the state, is a necessary component in the creation of New War LICs. This is also often seen manifested in the use of proxy groups fighting on the state’s behalf, whether the government or the civilian population organized these paramilitary forces.

[1] Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War (1991). New York: The Free Press; pp. 10-18

[2] Van Creveld (1991), pp. 20

[3] Van Creveld (1991), pp. 20

[4] Van Creveld (1991), pp. 21

[5] Van Creveld (1991) pp. 21

[6] Van Creveld (1991) pp. 21

[7] The only two conventional conflicts to break this mould are the Korean War and the Iran-Iraq War . Van Creveld (1991), pp. 21

[8] For further readings on these conflicts in the context of New War, and application of the theory to individual conflicts, I strongly recommend the following texts:
Ellis, Stephen. The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War. New York: NYU Press (2007).
Flint, Julie and Alex de Waal. Darfur: A New History of a Long War. Zed Books (2008).
Gallaher, Carolyn. After the Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaires in Post-Accord Northern Ireland. Cornell University Press (2007).
Kirk, Robin. More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia (2003).
Tishkov, Valery. Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. University of California Press (2004).

[9] See the above texts as well as
Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press (1991)
Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford University Press (2001)

Pre-Enlightenment Authors

ProfPTJ — Mon, 11 May 2009 22:13:12 CDT

The time before the Enlightenment, or Pre-Enlightenment era, is sometimes called “the Dark Ages” or “Antiquity.” It was an era often characterized by violent wars, absolutism and religious turmoil. Despite the momentous cultural and political changes occurring during this time period, the theorists and philosophers who characterize this era are far from “dark.” These thinkers and their works paved the way for both Enlightenment and modern philosophers with their discussions of topics from war craft to human nature.

The Pre-Enlightenment authors we studied in this course include Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian War, and Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince and The Discourses.

Rousseau and IR

ayseren — Mon, 11 May 2009 17:33:49 CDT

Interstate Relations

“Men are not naturally enemies” (145). War can neither exist in the state of nature where there is lack of constant property nor in the social state where there is supreme authority of law (145).
Rousseau concludes that war can only be a relationship between states. Men can only be enemies as soldiers, but not as men or citizens (145). Each state can only have as enemies other states because there cannot be a relationship between things of different nature. Where there is the rule of natural liberty or the rule of law, men are not prone to wage war. However, war can exist with another state that falls outside the reign of the social contract. This can be understood as Rousseau’s view of interstate relations that are mainly dominated by war and the absence of an international “general will” and global morality.
However, the peace may be the general will of the peoples of each state, in such a circumstance cooperation may be possible. Yet, the IR adaptation of Rousseau's perspective is open ended.

International Law and Justice

The philosopher does not refute the notion of an international law or justice system completely and asserts that universal justice can come form reason alone and must be reciprocal. Simultaneously, he describes the “laws of justice to be without teeth among men” (161). Furthermore, Rousseau views it “an evil to unite several towns in a single city” (169) whereby he expresses his rather pessimistic view of the international system. Due to the difference of laws in differing provinces and customs, a body that is big and diverse in its people is doomed to collapse (168).

Rousseau a constructivist?

Rousseau understands the social world as constructed and arbitrary and not true to human nature and aims at the deconstruction of the reality that imprisons both master and slave (141). Injustice is created by convention, rather than by nature as all “…are born men and free. Their liberty belongs to them; they alone have the right to dispose of it” (Rousseau 144). The notion of freedom and independence is embedded in nature, but has to be realized in the social contract in order secure its permanency. The philosopher emphasizes the significance of consensus, as only a society constructed by the consensus of the people through the general will can provide for equality among men, other societies are mere constructions of inequalities and dominations that inhibit freedom, which is the highest goal of human nature.

The role of the general will

Rousseau does not claim natural agreement among the private wills, but regards the general will as universally binding that it will be necessary to follow its rule as it will affect oneself. Under the rule of the general will, there remain no barriers to cooperation because “one cannot work for someone else without also working for oneself” (157). “As no one is unjust to himself” (161), the objective reality that the general will produces is universally just and free, thereby solving the public goods dilemma that is existent in liberalism. The general will by its very existence creates interdependence.
The general will has almost a deterministic character, as it knows what is right for the people although the people might not be aware of it. It reflects also a normative structure that is inherent in people due to the universality of the human ability to reason. The general will, in contrast to the “will of all” reflects the general interest that guides humans in their search for freedom and knowledge. The will of all, in contrast, is expressed as the sum of all private interests, which Rousseau defines as passions that ought to be controlled in the attainment of freedom. Furthermore under the general will “one is both free and subject to the laws, since they are merely the record of our own wills” (161).
The general will plays a key role in deconstructing and reconstructing reality. First it reveals that the system is marked by institutional or structural injustice and suppresses the natural human liberty. The general will calls upon the people to become “equal by convention” and claim natural rights of liberty and equality that can be secured under the social contract (Rousseau 153). Rousseau deconstructs the world or reality that is marked by injustice and the “chains” that bind people in order to reconstruct a new reality by consensus with the help of the general will.
The process of deconstruction and reconstruction makes the general will successful in overcoming the barriers to cooperation and creating freedom and justice.

N.Inayatullah - International Relations and the Problem of Difference

ErinKay — Mon, 11 May 2009 10:52:41 CDT

Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney's International Relations and the Problem of Difference is a post-colonial reconceptualization of the theory and institutions of International Relations that focuses on what they call "the problem of difference" -- the inability of the West to perceive and respect both difference and similarity in others without falling into either assimilationist hierearchical practices. They trace the problem of difference back to the Peace of Westphalia and the Europeans' initial encounter with the American Indians and follow it through contemporary trends in IR, including modernization theory and International Political Economy. They offer a critical theory alternative to contemporary IR (here without the in text citations): "We would highlight, instead, the 'cultural complexity' of the world: that competing visions for constructing global social and political space form and circulate within and across complex cultural terrains; that these visions and the traditions and cultures that spawn them are overlapping and interacting, such that every identity owes a debt to alterity and every vision is multiple, containing dominant and recessive voices that conjoin with others near and far; and finally, that processes of cultural differentiation and interaction have entailed relations of domination and subordination" (8).

The Westphalian Deferral: Inayatullah and Blaney attribute the inception of the modern nation-state to the Peace at Westphalia following the Thirty Years War in 1648. They view the creation of modern European states as an attempt to contain religious difference through sovereign territoriality, and find this problematical for two reasons. First, the state system relegated difference to autonomous regions; tolerance may have been practiced among states but nation-states did little to engage difference within. Rather, it was assumed that each nation-state would contain an internally homogeneous population. Second, Westphalia created the idea that disorder and conflict result from difference whereas uniformity leads to order and stability. Inayatullah and Blaney reject these Westphalian intellectual legacies, but not the theoretical concept of sovereignty; instead, they envision "multiple and overlapping sovereignties ... heterogeneous (global, regional, local) social processes and political arrangements, involving complex ways of demarcating and negotiating separate, shared, and overlapping authority" (125).
Intimate Indians: In their discussion of Europeans' first encounter with American Indians, the authors draw heavily upon ideas from Todorov's The Conquest of America. They frame their analysis using Todorov's "double movement": "the other is greeted with a pattern of response that either tries to fully assimilate the other to self, repressing difference, or designates the other as radically different, denying a common humanity" (39). They use case studies of several Europeans' writings on the Indians to highlight how this double movement plays out and also how modern theories of development, universal rights, and even critical self-reflection have their roots in historic encounters with the other.

"In a world of cultural and ethical complexity, it is difficult to "make sense..." if one is not able to listen to the voice of others" (220).

World Systems Theory

Zakahi — Sun, 10 May 2009 14:09:34 CDT

World system's theory is a neo-marxist theory about the operation of the global economy. It contrasts the core (major, industrialized states), from the periphery (the third world). In this theory the core takes advantage of the periphery by imposing a system which puts the periphery at an eternal economic disadvantage. The perihpery takes raw materials from the periphery (metals, spices, labor) before adding value and then selling the materials back to the perphery at a higher price.

World System theorists argue that "IR can only be sufficiently understood within the context of this system" (200).
It is mainly interested in relations between "wealthy capitalist societies and the rest of the globe" (201).
Theorists remain loyal to "positivist epistomology and methodologies" (204).

T. Todorov - Conquest of America

ayseren — Sat, 09 May 2009 10:02:00 CDT

[to be connected to Wikipedia]
The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other was first published in 1982 by Tzvetan Todorov. Structured as a combination historical narrative/exemplary myth, the book studies the Europeans' first encounters with and subsequent conquering of the native peoples of the Americas.

The Conquest of America Synopsis

Todorov divides his narrative into 4 parts. The first three are, to some extent, analogous to the three axes in his typology of relations to the other, as presented in the forth and final section titled Knowledge. He also loosely centers each of the first three sections on a historical figure in the Spanish conquest of America. These associations are somewhat tenuous since Todorov's narrative jumps around and all the various figures are mentioned throughout the text, but they give the writing an elegant structure.

Discovery
In this section Todorov describes Columbus' unintentional 'discovery' of America and what Columbus makes of the inhabitants he finds there. Todorov argues that Columbus fails to perceive difference and projects his own values onto the natives. Indeed, his accounts of the misadventures of Columbus would be comical were they not the historical precursor to tragedy. Todorov paints Columbus as a very medieval man, in direct contrast to the startlingly modern Cortez and the characters that follow him.

Columbus’s discovery of America is regarded as the starting point. When Columbus arrives in the New World he declares his admiration for the Indian people (Todorov 36). However, Todorov describes that Columbus perceives them equal to himself leading him to understand them as identical to himself, which ultimately translates to assimilationist behavior. Assimilation is associated with the Spaniards’ desire to convert the Indians to Christianity, which Todorov describes as Columbus’ initial project (43). This very desire reflects that Columbus perceived the Indians on the same level suppressing their difference from the Spaniards. The author points at the paradox in the Spaniards’ action as conquerors who embark on plundering of gold on the one hand and on converting people to Christianity on the other. The former presupposing inferiority and inequality, the latter equality (45).

Conquest
"'Language has always been the companion of empire.'" (p. 123)

Here Todorov explores the conquest of the Aztec empire by Cortez. He looks for reasons for the relative ease with which such a relatively small group subdued a large native polity. He reviews the following commonly explanations for the conquest: hesitation within the Aztec leadership, Cortez' exploitation of internal divisions among the natives, and the superiority and novelty of Spanish weaponry. Without denying the importance of these factors (See also, Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel) Todorov seeks to find a common basis for them by studying how the Aztecs and Cortez used communication differently. While striving to avoid labeling either side's methods as superior or inferior, he suggests that it was Cortez' communication methods that enabled his victory. Todorov posits that for the Aztecs communication with the world and/or the gods takes precedence over inter-personal communication, and is highly ritualized. He ties this in with Aztec notions of cyclical time and historical predestination. Todorov finds that language for the Aztecs is foremost a tool for integration within the community. In contrast Cortez uses language foremost for manipulation of the other and unlike Columbus (as described on p. 33) is a master of interhuman communication (p. 123).

Finally, Todorov includes in his analysis a note of regret for what he thinks was lost in the Spnish victory:

"The Spaniards win the war. They are incontestably superior to the Indians in the realm of interhuman communication. But their victory is problematic, for there is not just one form of communication, one dimension of symbolic activity. . . this victory from which we all derive, Europeans and Americans both, delivers as well a terrible blow to our capacity to feel in harmony with the world. . . The silence of the gods weighs upon the camp of the Europeans as much as on that of the Indians." (p. 97)

Chapter:	Discovery	Conquest	Love	Knowledge	Epilogue
Axis:	Epistemic?	Praxeological	Axiological	Epistemic?
The other's identity is...	Known/ Unknown	Identified With/ Imposed Upon	Good / Bad	Known / Unknown
Character:	Columbus	Cortez	Las Casas	Duran? Sahagun?	The Reader?

This quote serves to tie the section into Todorov's broader point that the Spanish conquest represents a fundamental break between the medieval and the modern.

Love
This chapter is largely concerned with yet a third historical figure, Las Casas, and the evolution of his sympathy towards and understanding of the native culture. Todorov reflects on whether it is possible to love something without understanding it. There's also a discussion of enslavement and colonialism with relation to communication. [--more needed--]

Knowledge
In this final section Todorov presents the typology of relations to the other that informs his writing. He identifies three axes on which to locate the "problematics of alterity" (p. 185). He further asserts: "There exist, of course, relations and affinities between these three levels, but no rigourous implication; hence, we cannot reduce them to one another, nor anticipate one starting from the other," Todorov continues, "Knowledge does not imply love, nor the converse; and neither of the two implies, nor is implied by, identification with the other. The rest of the section is something of a meditation on various combinations of the three axes.

Todorov's argument also constitutes a rebuke to the idea of teleological history as expounded by Kant and Hegel, as well as a rejection of the Enlightenment ideal of reason bringing understanding and harmony. In this Todorov has much in common with E.H. Carr's criticism of liberal utopianism. Yet at the same time, Todorov would probably be reluctant to accept Carr's assertion that we can know the world "as it is" through objective realism. Still, both authors seem to have convergent ideas about progress. For Carr progress is only possible through a synthesis of realism and idealism, which would surely require the sort of consciousness of the relativity and arbitrariness of culture and history that Todorov affirms.

Please bear in mind that all three axes have bearing on all three sections and the personalities they cover. This chart seeks only to identify which appears to be most salient in each section.
Chapter: Discovery Conquest Love Knowledge Epilogue
Axis: Epistemic? Praxeological Axiological Epistemic?
The other's identity is... Known/
Unknown Identified With/ Imposed Upon Good / Bad Known / Unknown
Character: Columbus Cortez Las Casas Duran? Sahagun? The Reader?

Criticism of Todorov

text goes here

Questions
Does understanding necessarily lead to empathy?

Does experience lead to knowledge?

It remains unclear whether Todorov's work oscillates between posing a premise and a consequence. Could the conquistadors have acted differently given their cultural constraints and the lack of knowledge of the other? Has this discovery contributed to the understanding of the other and thereby helped cultures to be on equal footing through rapprochement and communication?

Quotes

"I have chosen to narrate a history. Closer to myth than to argument, it is nonetheless to be distinguished from myth on two levels: first because it is a true story...and second because my main interest is less a historian's than a moralist's; the present is more important to me than the past" (4).

"Columbus's failure to recognize the diversity of languages permits him, when he confronts a foreign tongue, only two possible, and complementary, forms of behavior: to acknowledge it as a language but to refuse to believe it is different; or to acknowledge its difference but to refuse to admit it is a language" (30).

"...Columbus regularly claims to understand what is said to him, while giving, at the same time, every proof of incomprehension" (31).

"The first mention of the Indians is significant: 'Presently they saw naked people'" (34).

"...Columbus's behavior implies that he does not grant the Indians the right to have their own will, that he judges them, in short, as living objects" (48)

"It is this particular way of practicing communication (neglecting the interhuman dimension, privileging contact with the world) which is responsible for the Indians' distorted image of the Spaniards during the first encounters" (75).

"...the Spaniards see the ease of their conquest as a proof of the excellence of the Christian religion" (87).

"Everything happens as if, for the Aztecs, signs automatically and necessarily proceed from the world they designate, rather than being a weapon intended to manipulate the Other" (90).

"[The Spaniards] are incontestably superior to the Indians in the realm of interhuman communication" (97).

"Cortes's behavior irresistibly suggests the almost contemporary teachings of Machiavelli" (116).

"Language exists only by means of the other, not only because one always addresses someone but also insofar as it permits evoking the absent third person; unlike animals, men know citation" (157).

"But their history can be exemplary for us because it permits us to reflect upon ourselves, to discover resemblances as well as differences: oncea gain self-knowledge develops through knowledge of the Other" (254).

Spring 2009 IR Theory course wiki Home

NordSee — Sat, 09 May 2009 05:09:48 CDT

Welcome to Theories of International Relations Course Wiki

Part of an International Relations Theory course, this Wiki was designed as a collaborative effort to compile a database which can be used to inform readers of IR Theory. Feel free to navigate the topics on the left hand side of this page to learn more about some of the most well-known and frequently cited authors that are going to guide our expedition in making sense of the IR Theory.

What is IR Theory?
World politics is full of dramatic singular events: wars, financial crises, terrorist attacks, peace talks, revolutions, popular campaigns. International Relations (IR) theory helps us explain and understand those events by equipping us with the appropriate conceptual tools to place these events into context (from the Syllabus). See also: Modern Theories of International Relations

What are we discussing?
Throughout the course of this semester this wiki will feature the works of the following philosophers / authors / scholars:

Thucydides - The History of the Peloponnesian War
Niccolo Machiavelli - The Prince & The Discourses
Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan
John Locke - Two Treatises of Government
Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The Social Contract
Immanuel Kant - Perpetual Peace
G.W.F. Hegel - Introduction to The Philosophy of History & The Philosophy of Right
John Mearsheimer - "The False Promise of International Institutions"
Andrew Moravcsik - "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics"
Alexander Wendt - "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics"
Thomas Risse - "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics"
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson - "Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue"
J. Samuel Barkin - “Realist Constructivism”
J. Ann Tickner - “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists" & “Continuing the Conversation”
Robert Keohane - “Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory”
Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney - International Relations and the Problem of Difference

In addition to:
Edward Halett Carr - Twenty Years' Crisis
Tzvetan Todorov - Conquest of America

Wiki Updates:

Machiavelli--The Prince and The Discourses

lauren.barr — Sat, 09 May 2009 02:20:22 CDT

The Prince (1513)

By Machiavelli’s own description, The Prince is a compilation of years of political and diplomatic experience, condensed into a straightforward presentation of advice to the new ruler of Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici. Machiavelli begins with descriptions and definitions of different types of principalities, making it clear that The Prince is concerned with autocratic or monarchical regimes, not republics. Following this introduction, Machiavelli begins issuing advice on a wide range of political matters including building alliances, ecclesiastical states, mercenaries, how to wage war, building fortresses and accumulating power.

Machiavelli progresses with descriptions of the qualities that a ruler must possess to rule. Machiavelli argues that the manner in which a ruler is perceived is crucial—Princes must be feared enough to be obeyed, but loved enough not to be deposed. For this to be possible, rulers must suppress personal virtues while sometimes committing immoral acts in order to preserve power and protect their principalities.So in Chapter 15 he states that a leader should learn how not to be good.Machiavelli further argues that in addition to flexible morals, it is necessary to retain the support of the public to maintain power. This support can be kept in a number of ways, including limited generosity, appearing religious, not persecuting citizens and decisiveness.

Machiavelli ends The Prince by reflecting on the current state of politics in Italy. He critiques former rulers including the King of Naples and the Duke of Milan for poor military preparation and losing the support of the populace. He finishes by claiming that Lorenzo de’ Medici, to whom the book is dedicated, is the only man who can quell the tumult in Italy.

The Discourses (1517)

While Machiavelli is most well-known for The Prince, his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius are no less important to the early literature on international relations. Livy, who wrote a 142-book history of Rome, supposedly provides the evidence for Machiavelli’s conclusions regarding republics. In the preface, Machiavelli presents his work as a gift to two friends – private citizens – whom he commends as having “innumerable fine qualities [that] make them worthy to be princes” (82), thus setting this up not as a book for kings, but rather for those wishing to be active participants in a republican form of government.

In The Discourses, Machiavelli departs from his talk of principalities under a single monarch (which forms the premise of The Prince) and instead extols the virtues of a republic. In Book One, he explains the circumstances under which a republic can be successfully formed, the necessity of having a constitution and a strong religious institution, and the most beneficial relationships between the populace, aristocracy, and leaders. In the second book, Machiavelli focuses on the acquisition and defense of an empire through warfare. Using Rome as the paragon, he examines the decision-making of weak states, the use of auxiliary and mercenary troops, the risks and benefits of conquering new territories, and the limitations of fortuna. In Book Three, he is concerned with ensuring the longevity of a republic, including his advice to adhere to founding principles while changing with the times and constantly focusing on defending the republic.

Emphasizing a strong role for the populace, Machiavelli suggests that political debate and internal conflict, with the appropriate balance of power, can actually serve to strengthen a state. As with The Prince, his pragmatic approach to ethics and politics colors his advice and his supposed “commentary” on Livy’s history functions as a sort of guidebook for the creation and governance of a republic. Generally speaking, Machiavelli’s vision is one of a robust and free political culture with an emphasis on military might and with strong leaders to guide the people and prevent corruption.

Questions for Discussion
1. One major difference between The Prince and The Discourses is the change in subject from principalities to republics. What explains this change in subject matter?

2. Machiavelli based The Discourses on Titus Livius’ (Livy) History of Rome from its Foundation. How does this emphasis on one source impact his work’s legitimacy?

3. On pg. 167 of The Discourses, Machiavelli discusses an event from the Peloponnesian War. How does his interpretation vary from that of Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War?

Thucydides--History of the Peloponnesian War

lauren.barr — Sat, 09 May 2009 02:18:43 CDT

"Thus this was t he worst invasion of all except the second." --Thucydides, speaking of the fifth invasion of Attica.

"The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must." --Thucydides, Melian Dialogue (alt. translation on p. 402).

Summary

The Peloponnesian War took part between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides's books contain a great deal of conversation; and, in his introduction, Thucydides explains his methodology using words that were “called for by each situation,” even if he was not sure of the “precise words used in the speeches.” He declares the Peloponnesian War as the greatest war in history due to large number of losses in the Greek World and the duration of the war.

Book One covers the lead up to war between Sparta and Athens. It opens with a series of territorial disputes between Corinth, an ally of Sparta, and Corcyra, an ally of Athens. In these disputes, Corinth is defeated mainly because of Athenian support for Corcyra. Corinth then demands that Sparta hold Athens responsible for breaking the peace treaty agreed to after the Persian War and, in turn, go to war with Athens. Sparta agrees with Corinth, but asks that all the Peloponnesian allies hold a unanimous vote before formally going to war. In the meantime, Thucydides briefly covers the history of the period immediately following the Persian War. He focuses on how Athens was able to quickly rise to prominence, despite having been devastated during the War, and how this rise made the Spartans wary of the city. Returning to the major time-line, Thucydides recounts the Peloponnesian decision to go to war, including the positive response received from the oracle at Delphi. Finally, he recounts a series of demands made by Sparta which are rejected by Athens, ultimately leading to war.

Book Two opens with the initial campaigns of the war whereby Athens withdrew all of Attica into city walls in accordance with the strategy of Pericles, allowing Sparta to then raze the countryside. In response, Athens sends out a fleet to take cities on the coast of the Peloponnese. The book then covers the withdrawal of forces for the winter and the funeral of the first dead of the Athenians, at which Pericles gives an inspiring eulogy. The second book continues by covering the nasty plague that struck Athens just before the second set of campaigns. This plague badly damages the morale of the Athenians who make little progress in this second year. Pericles is forced, once again, to give an inspiring speech.

Book Three starts with a revolt on the Isle of Lesbos (an ally of Athens at the time). This revolt would ultimately be put down by Athens after the Spartan fleet, sent to reinforce the Lesbians, took too long to reach the island. Athens initially orders the male inhabitants of the offending city, the Mytilenians, put to death, but upon further debate the decision is reached to spare them -- and just in the nick of time, for the ship sent with orders to spare their lives arrived just after the ship sent with orders to kill them. The account then returns to the city of Platea, which is about to fall. After it falls there is a debate among the Spartans as to the fate of the city, a debate which ultimately leads to the destruction of the city and its inhabitants.

At this point the book turns to the revolt in Corcyra (which you may recall was one of the major players involved in starting the war). Here the pro-Spartan forces were defeated by the pro-Athens forces just in time for the Athenian fleet to broker a peace deal. Once again, the Spartans arrived after the action, but still managed to take a victory against a confused Corcyrain and Athenian fleet. Ultimately, the Spartan fleet chose not to attack the city, and it was retained by Athens. This leads Thucydides to briefly summarize what appears to have been widespread and violent uprising and civil war between pro-Spartan and pro-Athenian forces in many of the Greek city states over this period.

Questions:

-Is Thucydides presenting a piece of International Relations theory or simply a historical account?

-Can the word 'ally' be used to describe a state which is controlled by violence or fear of violence, or is this simply an occupied state?

For Further Reading:

Hayward Alker on the Dialectical Logic of the Melian Dialogue (Google Scholar)

Hegel--Introduction to The Philosophy of History

Kaitlin.Niccum — Sat, 09 May 2009 01:44:30 CDT

Born in Stuttgart, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) pursued his studies of theology at the University of Tuebingen. Along with Schelling and Hoelderlin, Hegel is creator of the period of German idealism. Until 1800, Hegel dedicated himself to social and religious issues. Following the turn of the century, Hegel devoted his philosophy briefly to the development of post-Kantian concepts.
Hegel applies his concept of negation and re-unification through internal conflict (antithesis) to many different areas. (In dialectic- thesis, antithesis, synthesis).

The post-Hegel era gives rise to two traditions, namely the right-Hegelians (Leo, Zeller etc.) who were politically and religiously conservative and the left-Hegelians (Marx, Feuerbach etc.) who were revolutionary in interpreting Hegel as an advocate of liberal democracy and atheism, in viewing the end goal of history in the "Aufhebung" (negation) of everything that restricts freedom and rationality.

"The final goal of the world ... is Spirit's consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualization of that very freedom." (22)

"History usually presents itself as a struggle of passions." (38)

"This imponderable mass of wills, interests, and activities -- these are the tools and means of the World Spirit for achieving its goal, to elevate it to consciousness and actualize it." (28)

"Humanity ... has an actual capacity for change, and change for the better, a drive toward perfectibility." (57)

"The state is the Idea of the Spirit in the externalized form of human will and its freedom." (50)

Reason, Freedom, the Individual and the State

Hegel's interpretation of world history turns on several abstract concepts, many of which he defines differently than the previous authors we have read. These concepts are briefly explained below for your convenience:

Reason: For Hegel, history is a fundamentally rational process. While this idea is by no means unique to Hegel (we've seen this most recently in Kant), Hegel ultimately unites universal Reason and subjective human will through a series of progressive interactions. Hegel writes that Reason is both substance and infinite power; that is, it "lives on itself" and needs no external means to produce Reason (itself) in the real world; it is the means to its own end. Everything is subordinate to Reason. Hegel also makes a distinction between self-conscious reason (presumably such as that possessed by individuals) and Reason (nous), immutable laws that govern the real world just as much as they exist as abstractions. This definition of Reason does not depend upon God or a notion of divine providence: Hegel draws a parallel between the two ideas to the extent that both realize their own ends, but notes that while divine providence is separate from concrete reality (which implies that we cannot understand its end goal), Reason is united with reality and we can understand its plan. Indeed, Hegel writes that "the time must finally come when we comprehend the rich product of creative Reason that is world history" (18).

Spirit: Hegel says that world history takes place in the realm of the Spirit and it is in "the theater of world history" that we can observe the concrete reality of Spirit. Understanding Spirit, then, is essential to Hegel's project. He starts by setting Spirit in opposition to matter. While matter is essentially determined by external forces (i.e. gravity), Spirit is determined by itself and this self-determination is what Hegel means by freedom (see below). Spirit, then, is completely autonomous; humans cannot influence Spirit, and all of world history is "the working out of the explicit knowledge of what it [Spirit] is potentially" (21).

Final goal of history: Hegel writes that "[t]he final goal of the world ... is Spirit's consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualization of that very freedom" (22). Although he shies away from religious language, Hegel also defines this as "God's will for the world" and the "Idea of freedom" (23). We get to this final goal through a constant struggle (taking place within the realm of human action) between the status quo and other possibilities, with new, better states of consciousness of freedom emerging phoenix-like from the ashes of the previous stage at indeterminate intervals. This entire process is the means by which Spirit becomes conscious of its freedom and this only happens when we are conscious of the unity of our subjective will and the universal rational will. At this point we are free, and this only happens in the context of the state.

Freedom: It has already been noted that freedom is the final goal of history, but it is important to understand that when Hegel says "freedom," he does not mean the freedom that political philosophers like Locke thought exists in the state of nature and is necessarily limited by the incursion of the state. Hegel rejects the basis of social contract theory (see pages 41 and 43, especially) that says people give up some freedom to the state in order to have their freedoms protected ("negative freedom"), and writes instead that "it is rather law, ethical life, the state (and they alone) that comprise the positivity and satisfaction of freedom" (41). Hegel is very clear that freedom does not exist in the state of nature; the potential is there but it must be actively achieved (43).

Universal Idea: On the one hand, we have the Idea of freedom in its "freely universal mode." This is the infinite, abstract pole that Hegel believes will (indeed, must) be united with the concrete pole to achieve the end goal of history.
Subjective antithesis: On the other hand, we have "the infinite antithesis" of the Idea of freedom. Hegel says this is "the abstractness of arbitrary will." This is the realm of concrete reality where individuals dwell and act according to their desires and impulses; they exist for themselves.The term "infinite antithesis" is actually a little misleading here because Hegel views this pole as finite (as it must be if the Idea is universal) and as the determinate element for actualizing the universal Idea of freedom.

Activity: Activity unites the two poles of the Idea of freedom: "Activity is the unifying middle term of the syllogism: one pole is the universal, the Idea that rests in the inner pit of Spirit; the other pole is externality as such, objective matter. Activity is the middle term which translates the universal and internal into external objectivity" (29). Activity is also defined as the element that is needed for the potential truth of Spirit to be converted to external objective existence.

Passion: Passions are what motivate action. We only act if doing so fulfills our own purpose, if we are interested in it: "We say, therefore, that nothing at all has come to pass without the interest of those whose activity is involved in it. And since we call an interest a 'passion' -- when all of one's individuality, to the neglect of all other interests and purposes one might have, is placed in the service of some cause; and every fiber of one's being, very last ounce of will-power is committed to it, so that all of one's needs and forces are concentrated upon it -- we must assert as a general proposition that nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion" (26). At risk of growing repetitive, history is all about uniting these passions with universal will.

Morality: Activity is thus based purely in self-interest and subjective passions, but it is permeated by a sense of what is "right, good, duty, etc." Hegel does not spend a lot of time discussing morality, because for him, morality is universal and essential. It is therefore not hard to know what is right and good: this can be determined by looking at laws and customs (31), especially as Hegel later asserts that "the law of the State is the objectification of the Spirit; it is will in its true form" (42). But while Hegel does not spend a lot of time defining morality, neither does he minimize its importance. Indeed, "morality, ethics, [and] religious commitment" are what prevent humans from being seen as a merely sacrificial means to the Spirit's ultimate end. For Hegel, these moral qualities make human beings ends in themselves "by virtue of the divine in [them] -- by virtue of what from the very outset, was call 'Reason'" (36). Having come full circle back to Reason, it is easy to see that treating human beings as means would be incoherent because they have a part in the rational end goal of history.

World historical individuals: World-historical individuals are those people whose subjective aims and passions align with the will of the World Spirit. They do not have to be aware of this alignment; in fact, Hegel writes that "These heroic individuals, in fulfilling these aims of theirs, had no consciousness of the Idea at all" (33). What makes them unique is their ability to see "possibilities that are injurious to the established order," and, more importantly, to realize these possibilities insofar as they coincide with the will of the Spirit, thus furthering the progress of history. Although he uses the term "great men" to describe people like Caesar, Alexander the Great, and Napoleon, Hegel does not mean they were "good" or moral: "such individuals treat other interests, even sacred ones, in a casual way -- a mode of conduct certainly open to moral censure. But so great a figure must necessarily trample on many an innocent flower, crushing much that gets in his way" (35). Also, they were generally unhappy and came to unfortunate ends.

State: The state is the form in which the end goal of history will be realized. It represents the union of the subjective will and the rational will and constitutes an ethical reality wherein the individuals can enjoy their freedom (refer to preceding definition), to the extent that they know it to be universal. Hegel writes that "all the value that human beings possess, all of their spiritual reality, they have through the State alone" (42). It is only within the context of the State that we achieve universal freedom. Hegel concedes that in order for the state to have an actual existence there must be a government and that this necessitates a distinction between those who order and those who obey, but unlike the social contract theorists, he does not see this government as a means of protecting freedom but rather as enabling it. It should finally be noted that Hegel does not much care about which form of government is best, because he sees this question as entirely dependent on how well-developed a given people's rational condition is. This is important because it means that historical forms of government can tell us nothing about what we should be doing now or about where we should be headed.

The Division of World History

World History is the actualization of spirit and its perfectibility; It represents the “advance from the imperfect to the more perfect.” "History must begin where rationality makes its appearance in consciousness, will and action” (62). Not all human actions lead to history, but actions and events must have a purpose that relates to the actual world and to the actualization of the substantial freedom where a self-conscious process is necessary (66). Therefore, as Hegel points out “much has happened without giving rise to history” (66). According to Hegel, history begins with the state because a state requires rules, laws, universal and universally binding directives (65). Spirit is expressed as using “world history as its theater, its property and the field of actualization” (58). Individual manifestations of spirit in external reality are only limited histories. The Spirit of the people that advances toward the ultimate goal of individual freedom by means of the actualization of the substantial spirit trumps the individual actions (71). World history does not have to take on moral judgments, because it is a judgment in itself. According to Hegel, great Men act as individual agents of world history, assisting the substantial spirit in its advancement and pursuit of the final goal.

Hegel describes the Old World as the "current theater of world history." It is divided in three parts and connected through the Mediterranean, which is the center and heart of world history. Hegel regards the Far East and Northern Europe as outside of world history whereas America is the land of future (90). ”In the time to come, the center of world-historical importance will be revealed there”, Hegel asserts, which has only been "an echo of the Old world so far" (90). For Hegel, history ends in the Germanic world and he does not want to spend time on the future because it does not matter in the "historical perspective" and "with what is eternal" (90).

The Stages of History
i. Theory
Four world historical realms correspond to the four phases of world history (103):
1. Individuality is sunk in the essence of the substantial spirit. Individuality and universal will are one.
2. The substantial spirit is for itself and conscious of itself (the beautiful ethical individuality)
3. The substantial spirit turns inward with its recently acquired self-consciousness and leads its way through to abstract universality. Opposition to the objective world, as the worldly spirit and the substantial spirit create an oxymoron in themselves.
4. By turning inward, the universal spirit is "at home" (103) and reunified with objectivity. After this process, world history, the spirit knows its own truth and can create laws in the objective and external world. As the spirit is self-conscious, the world becomes free and self-conscious because of its active process of creating actuality in the world.

ii. Application
1. Oriental World: "Childhood Phase of History"
World history starts in the Oriental World, where the particular human and the divine consciousness are not divided, ruled under a theocracy, an arbitrary rule that breaks apart and separates the human from the divine. The substantive and individual world are thus one. The antithesis or negation necessary for the perfectibility of the state cannot take place in this stage of world history as the subjective will does not exist self-consciously yet. Although rational will develops in the Oriental world, it does not reach subjective freedom and negation of itself. The lack of tension, which Hegel emphasizes as a necessary condition for the struggle between universal and subjective freedom, ultimately leads to the ruin of the Oriental world. The fall is not important, because the change is without progression towards the greater goal of the subjective freedom. The separation of the divine and human happens at this stage of world history. From this point onward, the individuals are guided by the universal spirit to freedom and self-consciousness by means of the Spirit's interaction with the subjective will.

2. Greek World: “a spontaneously ethical life”, "beautiful freedom"
Ethical life is impressed on individuals and is not achieved through the process of the self-realization of the subjective will. In this process, the principal of personal individuality arises that is imprisoned by its ideal unity. The ethical life is unified with individuals, but it does not exist as an abstraction. This union is marked by an unconscious morality and the struggle of the subjective will is thus absent. No free subjectivity of ethical life is apparent. This world is characterized by the existence of national spirits (e.g. the polis- Athens, Sparta etc.). Individuals are at this point not able to identify with themselves, but rather with their polis. Therefore, the will is not placed in subjectivity or self-consciousness, but rather on external powers such as Alexander.

3. Roman World: “realm of abstract universality”
The state emerges in an abstract way and works toward its goal of self-actualization. However, there is no concrete part for individuals in state formation. Individuals must surrender to the will of the common goal and work for the common good without identifying with it and becoming self-conscious of their subjective freedom. The common interest becomes detached from the individual interest (96). Individuals become private citizens and gain legal status as legal personae. This stage of history manifests the struggle between universality and individuality, the antithesis. As the individual is solely degraded to its legal status, the result is an arbitrary individuality that sees itself over the abstract universality. The element of personality becomes predominant while the community breaks apart and can only held together by external power. The legal system is only arbitrary and cannot make up to the loss of individual freedom because it does not pursue the absolute goal of the universal spirit for individual freedom. The individuals who have become subjects therefore seek consolation by developing private rights. Hegel describes the Roman world as the "purely worldly reconciliation of the antithesis" (97) where the individual freedom is suppressed rather than freed. Hegel further describes it as the Spiritual reconciliation, where external force is applied on the spirit and the spirit begins to distance itself from the reality and to look in itself for the reconciliation it needs. This is the beginning stage of the "life of inwardness," ultimately facilitating universal subjectivity.

4. Germanic world: "the old age of the Spirit is its complete ripeness", "Spirit returns to unity with itself"
This stage of history is marked by the complete ripeness of spirit. “Spirit returns to unity with itself, but as Spirit” (97), in its purified form. The divine and the concrete are reconciled at the end of history. There is a hard struggle between this-worldly and other-worldly wills. The spiritual realm degrades to here and now, whereas the worldly realm raises its abstract independence to the level of thought and to the principle of of rational being and knowing , to the rationality of right and law (105). In this "rapprochement" and reunification of the worldly and other-worldly spirit, the antithesis disappears and the end goal of subjective individual freedom is reached. The genuine reconciliation of the universal and the subjective spirit is revealed in the purified and perfected form of the state where reason actualizes itself. Hegel compares this process of unification to the reconciliation of Christianity, where the "ecclesiastical authority" immerses in the secular barbaric world. By this very process, the spirit loses its spirituality, there appears a higher form of rational thought that is realized in the principle of secularity alone. "The realm of thought is brought to birth" through universal principles and has Spirit as its guiding power. Finally, Spirit finds itself "in sich" (in itself) and realizes itself in an "organic outward being," the state. Freedom is now able to realize its concept and its truth in the world (98).

Discussion Questions

1. Hegel’s model of world history depends on great individuals (heroes, world-historical individuals). Assuming for the moment that history is progressing towards a finite end goal, does this progression depend on extraordinary people whose subjective will corresponds to the World Spirit? In other words, could the struggle between antitheses happen organically? Why would a self-actualizing structural process depend on individual agents? Could you have a model similar to Hegel's without the heroes?

2. Is Hegel’s end goal something desirable? What would it look like and how would we know if we were there? (Was Hegel was wrong about 19th century Germany being the end of history? Was Fukuyama was arguably wrong about the end of the Cold War being the end of history? Before we dismiss these ideas, is it possible we still living in the Germanic World [as Hegel defines it]?). Finally, does the end goal of history have to be attainable or would Hegel's explanation still work if we view our progress toward the end goal as asymptotic?

Thucydides- Political Leadership

Kaitlin.Niccum — Sat, 09 May 2009 01:41:48 CDT

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War presents a detailed history of the Peloponnesian War. For this reason it is essentially a manual on political leadership, decision-making and oratory skills. Essential examples of these leadership skills are embodied by Pericles, and also found in the Melian Dialogue.

The Melian Dialogue

Kaitlin.Niccum — Sat, 09 May 2009 01:41:01 CDT

The Melian Dialogue presents the negotiations between the Athenians and the Melians as the Athenians prepare to invade the Melian’s island of Melos. The Melians are described in The History of the Peloponnesian War as a former Spartan colony that refused to join with the Athenians as they crafted their empire, instead opting to remain neutral. However, when the Athenians began razing their land and engaging in other acts of open aggression, the Melians became outright enemies of the Athenians. The Melian Dialogue presents the Athenians telling the Melians that they can either pay tribute to them, or be invaded. The Melian’s argue that their neutrality should be respected, a position which the Athenians reject.

After the presentation of a number of other counterarguments, including the fact that international law protects their position and that the Gods will save them, the Melian’s ultimately conclude that they will not capitulate to the Athenians. Similarly, the Athenians refuse to change their position and order an invasion of the island. After destroying the island the Athenians “put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and children as slaves.”

The importance of the Melian Dialogue in modern times comes from its interpretation as a classic clash of realist and liberal ideals. The focus on power interaction and the relationship between weak and strong states has become a cornerstone of modern international relations.

Additional Sources:

Hayward Alker on the dialectical logic of the Melian Dialogue on Google Scholar.

Thucydides' Pericles

Kaitlin.Niccum — Sat, 09 May 2009 01:16:45 CDT

"The great man of the age is the one who can put into words the will of his age, tell his age what its will is, and accomplish it."
G.F.W Hegel Elements of the Philosophy of Right, iii The State, 318.

Thucydides' Pericles is a noted Athenian general and statesman. In The History of the Peloponnesian War Pericles' greatest moment is his funeral oration, given for the Athenian soldiers who died in beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles’ speech notes the sacrifice of the soldiers and the glory of their Athenian ancestors while simultaneously touting the value of Athenian democracy.

In the first segment of the oration, Pericles praises the dead and their Athenian ancestors. Pericles first fulfills the purpose of his oration by praising the dead Athenian soldiers who fought in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. While Pericles does not believe that proclaiming the glory of dead soldiers in a speech is appropriate, preferring “and it would be enough, I think, for their glories to be proclaimed in action,” he still praises their sacrifice, noting that “these men have shown themselves valiant in action.” He follows his praise of the deceased by glorifying their Athenian ancestors, stating, “for to the inheritance they had received, they added all the empire we have now.”

Following his discussion of the ancestors, Pericles begins discussing democracy, making several points about democracy that still resonate in modern times. Pericles speaks to a number of issues including:

-Foreign Policy: “Our city is open to the world, and we have no periodical deportations in order to prevent people observing or finding our secrets which might be of military advantage to the enemy.”
-Merit Based Advancement: “What counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state is kept in political obscurity because of poverty.”
-Equal Justice: “Everyone is equal before the law”

Pericles finished his oration by returning to the living, encouraging the people not to forget the dead and to continue to fight the war with valor and spirit. He ultimately concludes by expressing sympathy for the relative of the dead, noting that he “can see a hard struggle in front of you” as they mourn the loss of their love ones.

Enlightenment Era Authors (Plus Hegel)

Kaitlin.Niccum — Fri, 08 May 2009 22:31:51 CDT

The Enlightenment was a time of philosophical reform. A family of primarily French, British, and German philosophers assessed and debated the value of the societal institutions that had informed the previous eras. They primarily fought against the yoke of the Christian church and the notion of revealed truth, which was the dominant thought of the Medieval period. They intended to shine the light of knowledge into the darkness of the previous times (the dark ages). By taking the newly rediscovered ancient philosophical tradition and combining it with the established medieval tradition, the Enlightenment philosophers conducted an entirely new type of Modern philosophical inquiry that sought moral truth based entirely on reasoned principles. They wanted a more natural morality that could be understood by individuals through reason rather than revelation.

(Rousseau deviated most heavily from this framework. In addition to having fierce philosophical arguments with Hume and Voltaire, he believed that mankind should abandon reason and return to religious simplicity and that art and science corrupted man's morals.)

The philosophes varied in their ontological and epistemological claims. Their notions of reason shifted over time and between the eastern and western divide, but one thing they all had in common was an emphasis on the integration of science and philosophy. A scientific revolution inspired by Isaac Newton was sweeping Europe and philosophy was not lacking in fervor. One of the new philosophical goals was to model the world based on the Newtonian understanding of the universe. It ought to be ordered and harmonious and spherical. The humanities, within this new understanding, should complement each other and contribute to a fully realizable truth about the world (whether that truth was based in skepticism or idealism).

In Kant's essay, "What is Enlightenment?," he states that “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage [(also Unmündigkeit or immaturity)].” He says that people are lazy and allow others to think for them instead of using their reason. He calls for people to "sapere aude" (dare to know), and affirms that the public use of reason (discussing and debating universal truth) is a societal good - though they need to maintain obedience to their rulers.

It should be noted that Kant and Hume disagreed strongly on what the goal of the Enlightenment ought to be. While Kant wanted to enact a purely academic vision of freeing humanity to Reason, Hume thought that the academics ought to be brought into society to share their knowledge with the moderately educated masses. He wanted to take philosophy out of the academies and universities and bring it to the clubs and coffee houses. He purposefully crafted shorter, 3 and 4-page essays to appeal to a broader audience.

The Enlightenment authors we examine include some of the major names of the time, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. The philosophers who fit within this philosophical era number far greater than our capacity to list, but a few of these are Hume, Mandeville, Hutchison, Burke, Liebnitz, Smith, Voltaire, Didero, d'Alembert, Addison, et cetera.

Liberal Theory, as told by Andrew Moravcsik

oldkingCole — Wed, 06 May 2009 11:47:44 CDT

Unlike Realist international relations theory, liberal IR theory has had notorious difficulty in distinguishing itself as a contemporary counterpart in the realm of IR debate. Most who view liberal theory find it limited at best in its ability to cover all aspects of world politics. Realist John Mearsheimer finds liberal institutionalism (or Neoliberal Institutionalism) limited because it "does not directly address the important question of how to prevent war, but focuses instead on explaining why economic and environmental cooperation among states is more likely than realists recognize" (Mearsheimer 14). This kind of dismissal of liberalism as a whole inspired Moravcsik to set about theoretical assumptions of liberal IR theory in order to organize the theory into coherency. Moravcsik's attempt, however, raises only further questions about liberal theory as such.

Moravcsik's Three Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory:

1. The Primacy of Societal Actors : The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik 516).

2. Representation and State Preferences : States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposefully in world politics. (Moravcsik 518)

3. Interdependence and the International System : The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior (Moravcsik 520).

From these basic assumptions, he further labels three sub branches of IR Liberalism:

Ideational Liberalism - "Identity and Legitimate Social Order"
Commercial Liberalism - "Economic Assets and Cross-Border Transactions"
Republican Liberalism - "Representation and Rent Seeking"

He concludes his article with the implications his new reformatting of Liberalism has, from which he concludes that the study of world politics is not complete without encompassing the whole of Liberalism, Realism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism (or just Institutionalism to Moravcsik). From his perspective, Liberalism acts as a gateway towards understand policy decisions. Instate actors organize state preferences and thus govern state international policy. From there it branches into either Realism or Institutionalism based on the needs of the preferences. Moravcsik proposes all three as a unified view of world politics, in which liberalism takes priority over the others, as it is the gateway to arrive at all policy decision and thus affects which of the other two theories must be utilized.

The difficulty arises in the discrepancies between Moravcsik's interpretation of IR Liberalism, and those put forth by Mark A. Boyer and Michael J. Butler in "Public Goods Liberalism: The Problems of Collective Action" and Sean Kay "Neoliberalism: Institutions at War." Moravcsik directly challenges that Institutionalism is in fact a branch of Liberalism. "Neoliberal institutionalist theory has relatively little in common with liberal theory...because most of the analytic assumptions and basic causal variables employed by institutionalist theory are more realist than liberal" (Moravcsik 536). His concept of liberalism also stems from a bottom up approach to policy making, which dictates that individuals and in-state actors affect the policy decisions, not the other way. Public Good's liberalism, as put forth by Boyer and Butler, fluctuates between bottom up and top down approaches. In defining the actions of individuals within NATO during the Kosovo War, he both cites Italian government concern with instate opinions about militaristic action in Kosovo, and French government propaganda campaigns to raise support for government preferences towards military action in Kosovo.

Constructivism

sarahcaffey — Mon, 04 May 2009 15:50:43 CDT

Constructivism is the most popular alternative to Realism and Liberalism in modern IR Theory. Constructivism criticizes these dominant theories as being too focused on materialism, and is an attempt to foreground identity, legitimization, language, and the socially constructed nature of accepted norms as important problems within IR.

The main schools of Constructivism are Liberal Constructivism, Realist Constructivism, and Relational Constructivism. Each takes a different approach to constructivist critique of IR, but for the large part, they share the following ideas:

Anarchy is socially constructed and derives its meaning from intersubjectivity among states.
Intersubjectivity, or socialization between states through increased interaction capacity, causes changes in the identities of states.
States seek differentiation by means of identity. They can gather within "us" groups / collective units. (i.e. Western Civilization, the EU, the Arab League)
Constructivists, for the most part, argue in favor of logic of appropriateness than logic of consequences, therefore they are means-oriented. (i.e. We are the European Union, so we should act in X manner.)
The language of IR conduct is very important -- it is actors that give meanings to words.

Feminism

sarahcaffey — Sun, 03 May 2009 20:10:55 CDT

What is IR Feminsim?

"feminist IR scholarship is not simply about women, it is about the interdependence of masculine and feminine as socially constructed categories that shape how we know and experience the world" (MSIRT 246).
IR feminism is "the study of gender (rather than women) and the differences that gender makes to world politics" (MSIRT 246).
IR feminists "share the post-positivist commitment to questioning what we take for granted and to problematizing what is given as truth or knowledge" (MSIRT 245).
IR feminists believe that gender roles are socially constructed and question whether it is appropriate to assume we know what women are and what their feminine characteristics are.

Misconceptions of IR Feminism

IR feminists believe that females are more peaceful than males
World politics ruled by women is more peaceful because women are "naturally" tender and care-giving
Feminist IR theory favors "women's issues" over critical IR subjects such as wars, trades, and International Organizations

You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists by J. Ann Tickner

In You Just Don’t Understand, Tickner raises awareness of miscommunications that have arisen, primarily between feminists and IR theorists. Since its introduction into mainstream IR theory, feminism has been subtly ignored or criticized for being “more suitable for bedside reading than for scholarly discussion” (Tickner 612). Criticisms mostly came from IR scholars such as realists, neorealists, neoliberals, and empiricists who were dedicated to scientific, data-based, “problem-solving” approaches to IR theory. Their methods directly opposed recent critical approaches adopted by feminists. Due to the ontological and epistemological differences in approaching IR theory, feminists and IR theorists find themselves unable to understand or sometimes even unwilling to accommodate each others’ opinions, a cause of great concern for IR feminists such as Tickner.

Tickner’s Three Key Dichotomies

1. “Problem-solving theory" vs. “critical theory” dichotomy:

Misunderstandings between IR scholars and feminists arise from their different methodological approaches to IR theory. IR scholars favor traditional “problem-solving” methods and regard recent critical approaches as irrelevant to understanding international relations. Tickner claims that this unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of new approaches to IR is a great cause of the silence which feminist approaches have been received by mainstream scholars of international relations.

“Problem-solving” methods were traditionally favored by leading IR scholars such as Morgenthau who, in countering German fascism in the 1930s, claimed that theories must have a purpose. IR scholars continue to uphold this view and argue that theory building must be based on the possibility to control and predict events in the future, so as to understand solid, tangible outcomes.

Feminists, on the other hand, challenge this fundamental assumption that theories must have a purpose and be able to “solve” problems (Tickner 618). While “problem-solving” IR scholars implicitly accept “laws of nature” which help them understand and govern international politics, feminists deny the prevailing order of the world and instead ask “how” that order came about. This is a method of “truth-seeking” that attempts to question the validity of the IR theorists' understanding of a neutral, value-free world (Tickner 629). Adding to this, feminists also claim that the IR scholars’ belief in an objective, deterministic world is largely shaped by “naturalized” female subjugation and takes the weaker, vulnerable roles of women as granted. Not only is the IR scholars' claim to objective “problem-solving” invalid, but also reproachable for including female subjugation as part of their objective world views.

2. Positivist vs. post-positivist dichotomy:

Positivism: A philosophy which holds that the only authentic knowledge is that based on actual sense experience. Such knowledge can come only from affirmation of theories through strict scientific method.
Post-positivism: A school of thought which values qualitative over quantitative research, questions the possibility of objectivity, and draws upon the methods of deconstructionism.

Many IR scholars also posit that scientific observations of the world can help people understand causes of events and hence diminish the likelihood of war in the future (Tickner 618). Also called positivists, these IR scholars argue that scientific approach to international relations is possible based on the objective truth they see in the laws governing world politics.

Feminists, as post-positivists, deny objective view of world politics and prefer epistemological pluralism that pays attention to "historical, humanistic and philosophical" traditions of international relations (Tickner 619). According to feminists, there can be no “impartial, value-neutral Archimedian perspective” evidenced in mainstream IR (Tickner 622). Instead, events in world politics are “socially constructed” and “variable across time, place and cultures,” a view that fundamentally challenges IR scholars’ theories based on natural sciences.

3. Asocial vs. social dichotomy:

Feminists are deeply concerned with social relations, especially in terms of the causes and consequences of the unequally structured relationships between men and women. They believe that international relations has been socially constructed on the basis of misguided associations of power, autonomy, rationality, and the public sphere with masculinity; and weakness, dependence and the private sphere with femininity. They argue that IR scholars' asocial approach greatly overlooks these problems.

Goal of Feminism

Much of contemporary feminism has emancipatory goals, particularly to achieve equality for women by eliminating unequal gender relations embedded in the structure of international relations (Tickner 616). Theories in the realist paradigm are a great hindrance to achieving this goal given that they deny epistemological pluralities and critical approaches to international relations. Even liberalism, while it is committed to emancipatory goals of justice and peace, is still “constructed out of a definition of human nature that excludes or diminishes women” (Tickner 617). The purpose of feminist IR theory is to essentially challenge the unequally gendered structural relations in contemporary world politics and seek to bring about change that would better the lives of individuals, and particularly women.

While IR scholars claim that feminism is irrelevant to understanding international politics, feminists claim that this is a clear “misunderstanding,” because feminism ultimately differs in the epistemological and ontological approaches to international relations. It is crucial that feminists’ critical approaches to IR theory is legitimized, even if this means departing from the traditional analysis of international relations on the basis of scientific, falsifiable theories. Essentially, IR theories should move “beyond knowledge frameworks” currently established in world politics which hinder the participation of women and perpetuate “inequalities between men and women in the world of international politics” (Tickner 621). IR scholars must accept the fact that feminists challenge the “core assumptions, concepts and ontological presuppositions” based on gender bias, and with this in mind, seek to further their dialogues with feminist IR scholars.

Questions for Discussion

1. IR feminism, as Tickner delineates, is a critical theory. 20th century IR scholars claim that feminist approaches are normative and irrelevant to world politics which require a scientific, "problem-solving" method to predict and "figure out" world events. Is this true? Is IR feminism unnecessary because it cannot "solve" problems?

2. IR scholars have a point in arguing against the importance of IR feminism for its lack of "science" and empirical world view. Does this mean "problem solving" methods provide better solutions to world politics? Do they "help" international relations in ways that IR feminism fails to do?

3. In Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory, Robert O. Keohane claims that Tickner's dichotomies should be replaced by "continua" which places analysts of world politics "somewhere along the dimensions between critical and problem-solving theory" (Keohane 194). Tickner counters this claim by saying that this "inclusive middle" is problematic and that in fact Keohane remains committed to his social scientific approach and essentially denies their epistemological differences. Who is correct? Is it possible to replace Tickner's dichotomies with continua? Can "problem solving" and "critical" theories coexist without cancelling one another out?

Critical Theory (The Frankfurt School)

sarahcaffey — Sun, 03 May 2009 20:10:04 CDT

Critical Theory (The Frankfurt School) - from Making Sense of IR Theory by Jennifer Sterling-Folker
Started in Germany prior to WWII with heavy influence from Nietzsche. Due to the following of Enlightenment Project ideals, they see a universal moral code and look for how this plays itself in discursive practices of policymakers. They believe in the existence of a "meta-narrative."* Looking for ways to change this meta-narrative is a false attempt. Critical theory sees the need for a substitution and a change. "Critical theorists seek to understand the world in order to change it (163)." This liberal tendency is no surprise given its strong ties to Enlightenment Project.
Habermas' variety of this theory, as he himself states it, argues that situations of ideal speech acts can be produced which will reflect the truth and ethics inherent to language (164). Unrestrained communication is where the Habermasian variant would look for change. Additionally, there exists another modification: the historical materialism variant which encourages counter political/social movements (164).

Together with postmodernism, critical theory stands to challenge the US discipline of IR in general when it comes to being objective and positivist. The study of language and literature is the essence of both theories. "How actors justify what they are doing is very important to understand the world the deeds that follow " (160).What causes the divergence in these two theories from IR Constructivism is their methodology. Constructivism looks more scientific compared to these two theories to explain the social reality (160).

*This meta-narrative is a historical one: i.e. the universal truth.

Questions:
1. Both postmodernists and critical theorists are opposed to the use of positivist tools. The English School, on the other hand, is not as hostile to positivist methodology. Can change in IR be effectively explained by a normative approach?